Decision of the Hearing Panel of the Commission following the Hearing held at the Glynhill Hotel, Renfrew on the 10th and 18th March 2004

• The Complaint
• Preliminary Submissions
• The Hearing Panel Decision on Preliminary Submissions
• Submission 1
• Reasons for Decision
• Submission 3
• Reasons for Decision
• The Hearing Panel Decision
• Sanctions
• Reasons for Decision and Sanction
• Addendum

In respect of Report of D Stuart Allan, Chief Investigating Officer ("the CIO") further to Complaint No. LA/R/02 ("the Complaint") concerning an alleged contravention of the Councillors' Code of Conduct ("the Code") by:-

1. Councillor David Mylet,
2. Councillor Derek Mackay, and
3. Councillor James Mitchell

all of Renfrewshire Council ("the Respondents").

The Respondents were all represented by Mr Jim Sillars (the Respondents' Representative).

The Complaint

The Complaint relates to a meeting of Renfrewshire Council's ("the Council") Lifelong Learning and Work Policy Board, held on 5th June 2003. The Complainant, Councillor Roy Glen, a member of the Council and Convener (or Chair) of the Lifelong Learning and Work Policy Board alleged that the Respondents breached the principles of leadership and respect set out in section 2 of the Code and conduct in the Chamber or in Committee in section 3.14 of the Code. The CIO's Report ("the Report") was submitted to the Commission in accordance with section 14(2) of the Ethical Standards in Public life Etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, "the 2000 Act." The Code came into effect on 1st May 2003 and the Commission accordingly had jurisdiction to hear the Complaint, as the alleged breaches of the Code occurred after the Code came into operation. The CIO's findings in respect of the allegations of misconduct relate to two alleged disruptions at the said meeting of the Council's Lifelong Learning and Work Policy Board ("the Meeting") and concluded as follows.

In the case of the alleged first disruption:-

i. "in the case of Councillor Mylet, that he, without being entitled or authorised to participate and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, spoke loudly and volubly during item 3 of the meeting; that he physically disrupted proceedings further by leaving his seat, proceeding to the front of the Chair's table and continuing to address the meeting from that point in an intimidating manner contrary to the ruling of the Chair to resume his seat; and that he did not respect the Chair, Councillors and Council employees and members of the public present by so acting.

As such he contravened the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in section 2 on Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee;"ii.

ii. "in the case of Councillor Mackay, that he, without being entitled or authorised to participate and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, spoke loudly and volubly during item 3 of the meeting; that he physically disrupted proceedings further by leaving his seat, proceeding to the front of the Chair's table and continuing to address the meeting from that point in an intimidating manner contrary to the ruling of the Chair to resume his seat; and that he did not respect the Chair, Councillors and Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. As such he contravened the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in section 2 on Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee;" and

iii. "in the case of Councillor Mitchell, that he, without being entitled or authorised to participate and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, contributed to the voluble disruption, during item 3 of the meeting; that he physically disrupted proceedings further by leaving his seat, proceeding to the front of the Chair's table and continuing to contribute orally to the meeting from that point in an intimidating manner contrary to the ruling of the Chair to resume his seat; and that he did not respect the Chair, Councillors, Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. As such he contravened the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in section 2 on Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee."

In the case of the alleged second disruption:

i. "in the case of Councillor Mylet, that he, without being entitled or authorised to participate and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, spoke loudly and volubly on item 7 of business and that he did not respect the Chair, Councillors, and Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. As such he contravened the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in section 2 on Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee;"

ii. "in the case of Councillor Mackay, that he, without being entitled or authorised to participate and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, made a voluble instrusion on item 7 of business and that he did not respect the Chair, Councillors, and Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. As such he contravened the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in section 2 on Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee:"

iii. "in the case of Councillor Mitchell, that any intervention which he made was very limited and could not, by itself, reasonably be regarded as a contravention of the provisions of the Code".

Preliminary Submissions

The Respondents' Representative, upon the invitation of the Hearing Panel Chairman, made preliminary submissions as to the "competence" of the Hearing and concluded with a motion/application namely:

"That the Standards Commission for Scotland in seeking to hear and judge this case, now recognises that it breaches the human rights of Councillors Mylet, Mackay and Mitchell as set out in Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998; and that on these grounds the Commission dismisses itself from Case No: LA/R/02."

The Respondents' Representative made available to the Hearing Panel a broad transcript of his submission in relation to his motion.

The essence of the Respondents' Representative's submission was that if the Commission proceeded with the Hearing it would be acting in a manner which was incompatible with Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") as applied by the Human Rights Act 1998. This was a consequence of there being, in the Respondents' Representative's view, three breaches of the Respondents' human rights, namely:

1. That the Commission, in sitting as a Hearing Panel for the purposes of this complaint, could not be regarded as impartial, as is required under Article 6 of the ECHR by virtue of its institutional relationship and working arrangements between the Commission and the office of the CIO;
2. In hearing the complaint and having at its disposal statutory powers under the Ethical Standards in Public Life etc (Scotland) Act 2000 (the "2000 Act") to determine sanctions against the Respondents for breach of the Code of Conduct for Councillors, the Commission is determining the "civil rights and obligations" of the Respondents and accordingly the protections afforded by Article 6 are engaged; and
3. That the Commission, in refusing to exercise its statutory powers under the 2000 Act to cite particular witnesses and require delivery of certain documents at the request of the Respondents, has denied the Respondents the right to fully deploy their defence thus demonstrating an unavoidable indication of bias and prejudgement of the issue on the part of the Commission, making a fair hearing impossible.

The Hearing Panel Decision on Preliminary Submissions

The Hearing Panel dealt with Submission 2 above orally at the Hearing and agreed with the Respondents' Representative that before the procedural guarantees as set out in Article 6 of the ECHR may be relied upon, it must be demonstrated in the first instance, that there is, or will be, a determination of civil rights and obligations which engage Article 6. The Hearing Panel stated at the Hearing that it does and will conduct its hearings with the utmost procedural propriety and in accordance with the principles of Article 6.

The Hearing Panel, having considered the submissions made by the Respondents' Representative in respect of Submissions 1 and 3 determines as follows:-

Submission 1

The Hearing Panel does not consider that, in hearing this complaint, it cannot be regarded as impartial as required under Article 6 of the ECHR because of the institutional relationship and working arrangements between the Commission and the office of the CIO.

Reasons for Decision

The 2000 Act establishes two separate statutory bodies. Section 8 establishes the Standards Commission itself and section 9 separately establishes the Office of the CIO. Both have separate statutory functions and the Act explicitly preserves the CIO's independence in carrying out investigations and prevents the Commission from directing the CIO as to how he may carry out an investigation. Members of the Commission and the CIO are appointed by the Scottish Ministers on terms and conditions set by the Ministers and with security of tenure. Both may appoint their own staff although paragraph 7 of Schedule 4 does entitle the Commission to appoint staff as it considers necessary for the purposes of both the Commission and the CIO.

In judging any question of impartiality it is critical to do so from an objective, informed standpoint. This was confirmed in an authority put forward by the Respondents' Representative, Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties [2000] 2 WLR 870 which referred to the "informed observer". An informed observer in this case would therefore assess not just the structure and the relationship between the two bodies as set out in statute but also the arrangements which are in place in practice.

The Hearing Panel considers that an informed observer would readily understand that the CIO and the Commission operate independently of one another to the extent that is necessary. It has been accepted that regard must be had to the reality of a situation when examining convention rights, and not to technicalities. Case law under the ECHR has repeatedly emphasised that "alleged violations ... must be judged as questions of substance and not of form".

See Lord Bingham's judgement in Clark v. Kelly 2003 SCCR 194.

It is a technicality that, for example, there is one set of annual reports, or that the website does not detail the full degree of separation. The reality of the situation is that there is physical separation of the offices of the CIO and the Commission albeit they occupy offices in the same building safeguards are in place to ensure that the Commission does not have knowledge of the detail or substance of investigations of complaints by the office of the CIO, that all correspondence and other communication in relation to complaints are only dealt with by the office of the CIO and generally all possible steps are taken to ensure that these offices are wholly separate and operate independently of each other under the auspices of the 2000 Act. The Commission plays no part in investigations undertaken by the CIO or in decisions regarding the referral of complaints by the CIO to the Commission. Likewise, the CIO, beyond the presentation of complaints, plays no part in the determination of those complaints by the Commission.

Such practical safeguards taken together with the safeguards set out in the 2000 Act would be regarded as the type of adequate and objective safeguards referred to by Lord Reed in Starrs v. Ruxton 2000 JC 208 to which the Respondents' Representative referred.

Furthermore, the institutional structure of the Commission and the CIO which the Respondents' Representative takes issue with, is a creature of statute. The 2000 Act has determined to a large extent the framework and manner within which the two separate offices shall work and both the Commission and the CIO are, to that extent, bound by the terms of this legislation. If the Respondents' Representative does consider this institutional impartiality to exist, then it would appear to the Hearing Panel that his argument is with the drafting of the 2000 Act and the intention of Parliament. It is not clear from the Respondents' Representative's argument that he is intending to argue that the 2000 Act is incompatible with the ECHR. However, this is the logical conclusion of the Respondents' Representative's arguments and such an argument is not one which the Hearing Panel has the jurisdiction to hear or opine upon. Any issues regarding the compatibility of an Act passed by the Scottish Parliament should be raised in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Submission 3

The Hearing Panel does not consider that the Commission, in refusing to cite particular witnesses and require delivery of certain documents, has denied the Respondents the right to fully deploy their defence, nor does it consider that there has been any indication of bias or prejudgement of the issue on the part of the Commission, making a fair hearing impossible.

Reasons for Decision

In terms of the 2000 Act, the Commission has a statutory power under section 17(5)(a) which reads:

"The members of the Commission conducting a hearing may:-

(a) require any person to attend the hearing, give evidence and produce documents;..."

Section 17 further provides for the Commission to pay expenses to any person required to attend a hearing or produce documents as it sees fit. If any person refuses to comply with a requirement to appear and give evidence or to deliver up requested documents then he or she would be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine. These are the consequences which arise from the Commission exercising its powers under section 17(5)(a) of the 2000 Act.

Section 17(5)(a), by using the word "may" is discretionary and not mandatory. The Commission has a discretion as to when and why it exercises its powers to cite witnesses and request documents. It is therefore not bound to accede to any request to use these powers, other than when the Commission considers it appropriate or necessary to do so, particularly given the consequences referred to above which arise under section 17 for both the Commission and those persons cited.

In considering whether to exercise its powers in this case, the Commission had to have regard to the potential relevance of the evidence which could be adduced from those witnesses which the Respondents wished to cite as well as from the documentary evidence requested. The Commission sought further clarification as to this issue of relevance from the Respondents' Representative as it was not clear to the Commission, given the information presented to them by both the CIO and the Respondents' Representative, why these witnesses were relevant to either the findings in fact or to the question of mitigation of sanction. The Respondents' Representative was therefore presented with two opportunities to set out why these witnesses should be cited and documents retrieved. The responses did not satisfy the Commission that it was appropriate that it should exercise its powers in this regard because it was not satisfied that the evidence sought to be addressed from the persons requested to be cited or documents would be relevant to the issues for determination in the case of this complaint.

At this time the Commission considered carefully all the information which had so far been presented to it by both the CIO and the Respondents' Representative and had particular regard to whether refusal to exercise its powers in this instance would prejudice the position of the Respondents in the context of the hearing. In the Commissions' view, it did not.

An exception to this was made in respect of Mrs Margaret Quinn, whom the Commission did agree to cite as a witness, but who later agreed to appear as a witness of consent at the request of the CIO and who could therefore be cross-examined by the Respondents' Representative.

The Respondents' Representative has argued that this has failed to ensure that there is "equality of arms" which is essential to a fair hearing. The Respondents' Representative argued that the CIO in the conduct of his investigation was able to "roam freely" in gathering evidence and in respect of his witnesses yet the Respondents were denied key witnesses.

The authorities which the Respondents' Representative has directed the Hearing Panel to in this regard are Montgomery v HM Advocate (2001), McLean v Buchanan (2001) HRLR, R v Chief Immigration Officer ex parte Quahquah (2000) HRLR and Brown v Stott (2002) SLT. However, the Respondents' Representative did not expand his argument to set out the extent of the relevance of these cases and it is not clear to the Hearing Panel which aspects of these cases the Respondents' Representative considers to be in point.

It is a clearly accepted principle that the guarantees within Article 6 are not considered as discrete, stand alone guarantees, but as discrete elements which must be considered together. Clayton and Tomlinson in The Law of Human Rights 2000 (Vol 1) at paragraph 11.184 states that the composite rights which make up Article 6, including the right to equality of arms, are:

" subject to inherent limitations in the sense that a breach of any of them does not always mean that there has been a violation of Article 6. The fairness of the proceedings as a whole can be considered as it is often necessary to carry out a 'balancing exercise' between the interests of the individual and those of society as a whole."

It is clear from legal authorities as well as case law that the rights of parties to call and examine their own witnesses is not absolute and has limitations. One of the leading Scottish academic works on human rights, A Guide to Human Rights Law in Scotland by Lord Reed and Jim Murdoch in 2001 states at page 363 in relation to fair hearing rights for criminal charges;

" It does not entail the attendance and examination of every witness on the accused's behalf ..... thus domestic courts may properly assess the question of relevance of any proposed evidence within the confines of ensuring a fair trial.

This is supported by a European Court of Human Rights decision in Perna v Italy (25 July 2001) where it was held at paragraphs 26-31, in connection with a criminal charge:

"It is not sufficient for an accused to complain that he was not permitted to examine certain witnesses; he must also support his request to call witnesses by explaining the importance of doing so and it must be necessary for the court to take evidence from the witnesses concerned in order to be able to establish the true facts."

The case of AG v Covey, Court of Appeal, (unreported other than in The Times 2 March 2001) further confirms that the right to a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard does not entitle a litigant to an unlimited and uncontrolled chance to address the court.

The Respondents are not facing criminal charges in this context, rather, they are facing matters of a civil or disciplinary nature. Criminal cases demand a higher degree of procedural protection. However, if it is accepted in the context of more serious criminal proceedings that the right to call witnesses is not absolute but dependent upon the relevance of the evidence to the true facts of the case, then the right of parties to call witnesses in a civil or disciplinary context is likely to be qualified to the same or, indeed, to a greater extent.

In this case, the Commission carefully considered the impact of its refusal to grant the request to cite witnesses and deliver documents against the backdrop of the fairness of the hearing as a whole and any prejudice which may be caused to the Respondents. The witnesses in question were not required in relation to any dispute as regards findings in fact but rather in connection with what the Respondents' Representative had stated was the Respondents' defence or justification for taking the action alleged to be in breach of the Code of Conduct. With this in mind, the Commission was satisfied that the issues to which the proposed witnesses could speak to, if indeed relevant, could in any event be spoken to by other witnesses, including the Respondents themselves.

Accordingly, the Hearing Panel is satisfied that there has been no question of disabling the Respondents' defence and no breach of their right to a fair hearing under Article 6.

The Hearing Panel Decision

The Hearing Panel, having considered all of the evidence, the submissions made by the CIO and the Respondents' Representative, together with a consideration of the written testaments of the good character of each of the Respondents supplied by the Respondents' Representative, determines as follows:-

1. The Code applied to each of the Respondents.
2. A natural consequence of the acceptance by each of the Respondents that broadly their behaviour at the meeting was in accordance with the submissions and evidence of the CIO is that each are in breach of the Code as alleged by the CIO.
3. All of the Respondents contended that their actings in breach of the Code were a "political protest" reflecting their dissatisfaction at the number of places available to the SNP group on the Lifelong Learning and Work Policy Board which had been allocated by the majority Labour group. The Code is prescriptive with regard to the standards of conduct required by Councillors and it is no "defence" to allegations of breach of the Code that the actings of the Respondents were, in their view, a "political act".
4. The Respondents alleged that their behaviour/conduct was acceptable because of other alleged breaches of the Code by members of the Labour group. The Code requires high standards of behaviour/conduct of Councillors and allegations that others do not abide by the Code is no defence to breaking the Code
5. In the case of Councillor Mylet, in relation to the first disruption of the meeting, that he, without being entitled or authorised to participate in the meeting and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, he did speak loudly and volubly during item 3 of the meeting and that further he physically disrupted proceedings by leaving his seat, proceeding to the front of the Chair's table, and continuing to address the meeting from that point, contrary to the ruling of the Chair to resume his seat; and that he did not respect the Chair, Councillors and Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. The Hearing Panel accordingly uphold the CIO's allegation that Councillor Mylet did contravene the provisions of the Councillor's Code of Conduct as set out in Section 2 of the Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in the Committee. The Hearing Panel further hold that, in the case of Councillor Mylet, in respect of the second disruption of the meeting as listed in the CIO's Report, that without being entitled or authorised to participate and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, he spoke loudly and volubly on item 7 of business and he did not respect the Chair, Councillors and Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. The Hearing Panel accordingly uphold the CIO's allegation that Councillor Mylet did contravene the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in Section 2 on Leadership and Respect, and paragraph 3.14 on conduct in the Chamber or in the Committee.
6. In the case of Councillor Mackay in relation to the first disruption of the meeting, that he, without being entitled to or authorised to participate, and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, did speak loudly and volubly during item 3 of the meeting and that he physically disrupted proceedings further by leaving his seat, proceeding to the front of the Chair's table, and continued to address the meeting from that point, contrary to the ruling of the Chair to resume his seat, and that he did not respect the Chair, Councillors, Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. The Hearing Panel accordingly uphold the CIO's allegation that Councillor Mackay did contravene the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct as set out in Section 2 on Leadership and Respect ands paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee. The Hearing Panel further hold that in the case of Councillor Mackay in respect of the second disruption of the meeting as listed in the CIO's report, that without being entitled or authorised to participate and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist he made a voluble intrusion on item 7 of the business and he did not respect the Chair, Councillors, Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. The Hearing Panel accordingly uphold the CIO's allegation that Councillor Mackay did contravene the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in Section 2 on Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee.
7. In the case of Councillor Mitchell in relation to the first disruption of the meeting, he, without being entitled to or authorised to participate, and contrary to the ruling of the Chair to desist, contributed to disruptive conduct during item 3 of the meeting and that he physically disrupted proceedings further by leaving his seat, proceeding to the front of the Chair's table and participated with Councillors Mylet and Mitchell to disrupt the meeting and contrary to the ruling of the Chair did not resume his seat, and he did not respect the Chair, Councillors, Council employees and members of the public present by so acting. The Hearing Panel accordingly uphold the CIO's allegation that Councillor Mitchell did contravene the provisions of the Councillors' Code of Conduct set out in Section 2 on Leadership and Respect and in paragraph 3.14 on Conduct in the Chamber or in Committee.

Sanctions

Having found that each of the Respondents have contravened the Code we impose the following sanctions:

a) In respect of Councillor David Mylet that he should be suspended for a period of six weeks from Monday 19 April 2004 up to and including Monday 31 May 2004 from taking part in all meetings of the Council (Section 19(1)(b)(i) of the 2000 Act) and all meetings of the Committees or Sub-Committees of the Council (Section 19(1)(b)(ii) of the 2000 Act);

b) In respect of Councillor Derek Mackay that he should be suspended for a period of six weeks from Monday 19 April 2004 up to and including Monday 31 May 2004 from taking part in all meetings of the Council (Section 19(1)(b)(i) of the 2000 Act) and all meetings of the Committees or Sub-Committees of the Council (Section 19(1)(b)(ii) of the 2000 Act); and

c) In respect of Councillor James Mitchell that he should be suspended for a period of four weeks from Monday 19 April 2004 up to and including Monday 17 May 2004 from taking part in all meetings of the Council (Section 19(1)(b)(i) of the 2000 Act) and all Committees and Sub-Committees of the Council (Section 19(1)(b)(ii) of the 2000 Act).

d) That there should be no award of Expenses under Rule (13)(1) of the Commissions Hearing Rules.

Reasons for Decision and Sanction

1. By agreed Minute much of the findings of Chapter 5 of the Report of the CIO were agreed by all of the Respondents. Evidence from witnesses of the CIO were heard as was evidence from each of the Respondents in relation to the facts in dispute. In two important matters we did not uphold the CIO findings in his report, namely:

(i) We did not uphold the CIO finding that "around this time Councillor Mackay also cast a batch of copies of the SNP's statement on the table immediately in front of the Chair" - para 5.15 of the Report of the CIO; and

(ii) We did not uphold the CIO findings that any of the Respondents had acted in an "intimidating manner" - paras 5.22(1), 5.22(ii) and 5.22(iii) of the Report of the CIO.

We support all the other findings of the CIO in his report (Chapter 5).

2. Each of the Respondents confirmed that at a meeting of the SNP political group of the Council it was agreed that all of the Respondents' seek to cause disruptions in the manner they did at the meeting. It was also acknowledged by each of the Respondents that these actings were in breach of the terms of the Code. The Respondents accordingly acted in an agreed and pre-determined manner in acknowledged breach of the Code. Each of the Respondents actions at the meeting breach the standards of behaviour required by the Code.

3. None of the Respondents expressed any remorse for their actions which they each considered to be a justifiable "political act", nor were willing to do so at the Hearing.

4. In considering representations of the CIO and the Respondents' Representative, the Hearing Panel considered that the following mitigated in favour of the Respondents in determination of sanction:

(i) That each of the Respondents were long-standing and very well respected Councillors;

(ii) That each of the Respondents confirmed that their behaviour in breach of the Code was an isolated and "one-off" incident;

(iii) That each of the Respondents appeared to genuinely misunderstand that the Code would apply to what they considered to be a purely political action. The Hearing Panel are conscious that the actions of the Respondents constituting breaches of the Code occurred within five weeks of the Code becoming operative; and

(iv) Councillor Mitchell's lesser suspension compared with Councillors Mylet and Mackay, relates to his not taking part in the second disruption of the meeting.

The Respondents' attention is drawn to the Right of Appeal in respect of this decision which is contained in Section 22 of the 2000 Act.

Date: 15th April 2004

.................................................
Professor Lorne D Crerar (Chairman)

Addendum

The Hearing Panel were very concerned to note the evidence from the witnesses of the CIO which included Renfrewshire Council Officers and the Respondents themselves that there was an acknowledged "very long running feud" between the Labour and SNP group of the Renfrewshire Council which led, it was alleged, to behaviour which would breach the terms of the standards required to adhere to the Councillors Code of Conduct. It is important that this decision is not considered to be the outcome of yet another dispute between the Labour and SNP political groups. It is not. The foreword to the Code is declatory "The Ethical Standards in Public Life etc (Scotland) Act 2000 introduced a new ethical framework to Scotland, key elements of which are statutory Codes of Conduct and the Standards Commission for Scotland. As one of the earliest statutes passed by the Scottish Parliament, the Ethical Standards Act underlines the strong commitment to the promotion of high standards in public life by the Scottish Executive and the Parliament itself. Ethical standards and probity are now at the heart of decision-making in Scotland." Further the foreword to the Code states: "the Codes play a vital role in setting out, openly and clearly, the standards of conduct that must be applied and, in doing so, they will reinforce and strengthen public confidence in committees and those appointed to public bodies."

The Hearing Panel were of the view that this "long standing feud" between the Labour and SNP groups and the consequent behaviour make the upholding of ethical standards and probity, which has been placed at the heart of decision-making in Scotland, very difficult. In seeking to reach the aims of the 2000 Act, the Commission will deal with breaches of the Code on an individual case by case basis and in a balanced and fair manner, but it should be understood that the mitigating factor (4(iii) at page 12 of this decision [Reasons for Decision and Sanction]) is unlikely to be available in any future cases and sanctions may consequently be more severe.